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The spiritual lesson of Pearl Harbor is clear, or should be: a defeat is a set-back, but if the war goes on, no defeat is final. A corollary: you rarely know in advance what will be the knock-out weapon in the next phase of the war.

“Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1).

They left us the spiritual lesson of Midway: the appearance of inevitable defeat can be as much a mirage as the appearance of personal futility. False appearances can paralyze us more than real circumstances.

And what of Joe Rochefort, who had made the victory possible? Outraged by his success, the bureaucrats with Washington’s rival team had him transferred back. He asked for a sea duty, but he was assigned to command a floating dry dock at San Francisco. Only in April of 1944 did he return to Washington to work on Pacific fleet intelligence. But this has nothing to do with the spiritual lesson of Midway. It is the lesson of every bureaucracy since the Pharaohs.

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Gary North

Some trust in chariots, and some in horses: but we will remember the name of the LORD our God (Psalm 20:7).

In every era, men face problems that seem to be insurmountable. Nevertheless, one by one, these problems can be surmounted. The technical problems in life are relatively easy to solve, or have been for the past two centuries. It is the moral ones that offer the serious challenges.

There are times when a nation seems to be unstoppable. At other times, defeat appears inevitable. But appearances can be misleading, especially the appearance of inevitability. Those who are misled by it can suffer disastrous consequences.

I know of no better illustration of this principle than the Battle of Midway. For those who find themselves in the midst of what appears to be a monumental crisis, the story of Midway is worth remembering.

THE TURNING POINT

The Battle of Midway was the turning point of the war in the Pacific. It was fought mainly on June 4, 1942, although follow-up skirmishes, including a submarine’s torpedoing of the crippled U.S. aircraft carrier Yorktown, continued until June 6. It remains one of the most astounding battles in naval history, a David and Goliath tale even more remarkable than the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the English in 1588.

What was Midway? A pair of tiny islands in the middle of the Pacific, close to the international dateline. The Japanese hoped to capture this atoll from the Americans and make it the outer defensive boundary of the fleet. They also hoped to lure the American fleet into a suicidal attack after Midway fell.

The Japanese Navy brought a fleet of 88 surface ships to Midway, including four large aircraft carriers. The United States Navy brought a surface fleet of 28 ships, including three carriers. When the battle ended, the Japanese left Midway without its aircraft carriers. The U.S. Navy left with two. From that point on, the Japanese Navy fought a defensive battle for survival. The initiative in the Pacific shifted to the Americans, and never departed.

As in every critical battle in history, Midway’s story is the story of personal commitment, risks taken, surprises encountered, and detailed military plans: plans made, plans scrapped, and plans hastily revised. It is the story of remarkable courage on both sides, as most major battles are.

But Midway was marked by two very different kinds of courage: the courage of the warrior who believes that he and his colleagues cannot be beaten, and the courage of the warrior who suspects that he very well may be beaten, but who nevertheless draws deeply on a reservoir of inner strength – or higher strength – to give an account of himself and his cause. The Japanese possessed the first kind; the Americans possessed the second.

After their defeat, the Japanese spoke of “victory disease.” They had been too confident going into the battle. They had assumed that the Americans would do exactly what their war games strategies had supposed they would.

No better example exists of what several historians have called the miracle at Midway than the case of Floyd D. Adkins, who was the machine gunner aboard Ensign William Pitman’s SBD “Dauntless” dive bomber. The 175-pound gun had broken loose from its mount during the plane’s attack dive and had fallen into his lap. Then the plane came under attack by a Japanese fighter plane. Adkins propped the gun against the fuselage and fired. Down went the attacking plane. Yet when he was back on board the carrier Enterprise, Adkins could not budge the gun from the ship’s deck…

Great story here

CONCLUSION

Historian Gordon Prange was right: it was a miracle at Midway. So was Walter Lord: it was an incredible victory. But it is not enough to be amazed at the Battle of Midway. We should also be encouraged. Those doomed torpedo plane crews made possible a great victory, yet they did not live to see it. They left us the spiritual lesson of Midway: the appearance of inevitable defeat can be as much a mirage as the appearance of personal futility. False appearances can paralyze us more than real circumstances.

EPILOGUE

And what of Joe Rochefort, who had made the victory possible? Outraged by his success, the bureaucrats with Washington’s rival team had him transferred back. He asked for a sea duty, but he was assigned to command a floating dry dock at San Francisco. Only in April of 1944 did he return to Washington to work on Pacific fleet intelligence. But this has nothing to do with the spiritual lesson of Midway. It is the lesson of every bureaucracy since the Pharaohs.

Published on January 17, 1992.

I do not recall what grabbed me about this battle. I read numerous books. I went to Annapolis to use the library at the Naval Academy. I must have been in the region for some business-related reason. I do not recall.

The new movie on Midway is remarkably faithful to the facts of the battle.

The movie does not include this: two smaller carriers were sent to the Aleutian Islands: the battle of Dutch Harbor. The Aleutian attack was also a disaster. The details are remarkable. There were key violations of the military code and military orders. Wikipedia reports.

Tadayoshi Koga, a 19-year-old flight petty officer first class, was launched from the Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo as part of the June 4 raid. Koga was part of a three-plane section; his wingmen were Chief Petty Officer Makoto Endo and Petty Officer Tsuguo Shikada. Koga and his comrades attacked Dutch Harbor, shooting down an American PBY-5A Catalina flying boat piloted by Bud Mitchell and strafing its survivors in the water, killing Mitchell and all six of his crewmen. In the process, Koga’s plane (serial number 4593) was damaged by small arms fire. . . .The fatal shot severed the return oil line, and Koga’s plane immediately began trailing oil. Koga reduced speed to keep the engine from seizing for as long as possible.

The plane’s landing gear mired in the water and mud, causing the plane to flip upside down and skid to a stop. Although the aircraft survived the landing nearly intact, Petty Officer Koga died instantly on impact, probably from a broken neck or a blunt-force blow to his head. Koga’s wingmen, circling above, had orders to destroy any Zeros that crash-landed in enemy territory, but as they did not know if Koga was still alive, they could not bring themselves to strafe his plane. They decided to leave without firing on it.

How important was this? Very.

The Akutan Zero has been described as “a prize almost beyond value to the United States”, and “probably one of the greatest prizes of the Pacific War”. Japanese historian Masatake Okumiya stated that the acquisition of the Akutan Zero “was no less serious” than the Japanese defeat at the Battle of Midway, and that it “did much to hasten Japan’s final defeat”.

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