for the oligarchic rule of the State is its parasitic nature—the fact that it lives coercively off the production of the citizenry. To be successful to its practitioners, the fruits of parasitic exploitation must be confined to a relative minority, otherwise a meaningless plunder of all by all would result in no gains for anyone.

The root myth that enables the State to wax fat off war is the canard that war is a defense by the State of its subjects. The facts, of course, are precisely the reverse. For if war is the health of the State, it is also its greatest danger. A State can only “die” by defeat in war or by revolution. In war, therefore, the State frantically mobilizes the people to fight for it against another State, under the pretext that it is fighting for them.

https://mises.org/mises-wire/rothbards-theory-international-relations-and-state

Mises Wire •Ryan McMaken

Murray Rothbard is well known as an opponent of warfare perpetrated by states. This includes acts of war by states against other states, as well as acts of war by states against non-state organizations and individuals. Consequently, Rothbard historical scholarship and his political commentary is characterized by consistent opposition to aggressive warfare and imperialism as practiced by states in general, and by the United States government in particular. 

Thus, Rothbard’s normative analysis of foreign policy and international relations is quite clear in his many prescriptive statements calling for fewer wars, smaller wars, and more limited warfare in general. In this, Rothbard follows a long tradition of libertarian or radical “classical liberal” theorists. 

But did Rothbard provide us with a positive or descriptive analysis of international relations? That is, did Rothbard have a value-free theory of international relations describing the structure of the international system? The answer is yes if we extrapolate from his analysis of the nature of the state and how states interact with each other. 

The Fundamental Characteristics of Rothbard’s International System 

Rothbard’s description of international relations is characterized by four key tenets of states and their foreign policy: 

1. The international system is anarchic. 
2. States are controlled by an oligarchic ruling elite insulated from non-state actors, and a state’s foreign policy is primarily determined by the state’s elites who seek to preserve the system. 
3. Above all else, states seek to preserve themselves, and they seek to expand their own power, relative to other states, when possible. 
4. War can be a tool of domestic policy. In some cases, states tend toward war because wars offer an opportunity for states to expand the state’s power over the domestic population. 

The Anarchic System

In his essay “War, Peace, and the State,” Rothbard writes: 

In the modern world, each land area is ruled over by a State organization, but there are a number of States scattered over the earth, each with a monopoly of violence over its own territory. No super-State exists with a monopoly of violence over the entire world; and so a state of “anarchy” exists between the several States. 

This observation is hardly unique to Rothbard, and has been employed by international relations scholars from several different schools for many decades. Scholars differ on what they believe to be the implications and outcomes of the anarchic system, however. For Rothbard, the international system is characterized by violence partly because it is dominated by states—which are institutions founded on coercion. Rothbard recognizes, of course, that not all states are equally aggressive all the time. Some states are revisionist states and others are defensive, status quo states. This varies with the state of the international system at various times.  Moreover, state violence is often traced back to previous acts of state violence, as in the case of the post-World War I revisionist states which were reacting to the harsh provisions imposed by the victorious allies. Because states are focused on their own interests and preservation, states will only engage in international cooperation when it is of benefit to the state itself. What is of benefit to the ordinary people of each state—i.e., peace, freedom, and free trade—is rarely of primary importance to those who decide foreign policy.  

States Are Ruled by a Small Minority 

Central to Rothbard’s view of the state is the fact that “’we’ are not the government; the government is not ‘us.’ The government does not in any accurate sense ‘represent’ the majority of the people.”  This view has its origins in classical-liberal exploitation theory, and it is certainly reflected in Rothbard’s view of international relations. For examine, in For a New Liberty, Rothbard writes:

the normal and continuing condition of the State is oligarchic rule: rule by a coercive elite which has managed to gain control of the State machinery. There are two basic reasons for this: one is the inequality and division of labor inherent in the nature of man, which gives rise to an “Iron Law of Oligarchy” in all of man’s activities; and second is the parasitic nature of the State enterprise itself. 

Overall, Rothbard accepted the main tenets of elitism as he also shows when he writes: 

for the oligarchic rule of the State is its parasitic nature—the fact that it lives coercively off the production of the citizenry. To be successful to its practitioners, the fruits of parasitic exploitation must be confined to a relative minority, otherwise a meaningless plunder of all by all would result in no gains for anyone.

For Rothbard, this holds true whether or not a regime is allegedly a democracy, and the presence of democratic institutions does not fundamentally change a state’s behavior in the international sphere. Rothbard notes that, in evaluating state behavior in war: 

The theoretical reason why focusing on democracy or dictatorship misses the point is that States—all States—rule their population and decide whether or not to make war. And all States, whether formally a democracy or dictatorship or some other brand of rule, are run by a ruling elite. Whether or not these elites, in any particular case, will make war upon another State is a function of a complex interweaving web of causes, including temperament of the rulers, the strength of their enemies, the inducements for war, public opinion. While public opinion has to be gauged in either case, the only real difference between a democracy and a dictatorship on making war is that in the former more propaganda must be beamed at one’s subjects to engineer their approval. Intensive propaganda is necessary in any case—as we can see by the zealous opinion-moulding behavior of all modern warring States. 

States Seek Self-Preservation

See the rest here

Be seeing you