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Posts Tagged ‘nuclear arsenal’

The Nuclear Arsenal Problem You Never Saw Coming | The National Interest

Posted by M. C. on October 22, 2020

There is neither a strategic need for—nor any real safeguard against—presidential sole authority over the nuclear arsenal. This reality should push the public towards common-sense reform. 

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-arsenal-problem-you-never-saw-coming-171000

by Zack Brown

Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry lambasted the policy of presidential sole authority over the nation’s nuclear weapons, saying it was “in complete contrast with the Constitution, which reserved for Congress the right to declare war.” 

The issue of nuclear control was back in the news after President Donald Trump’s bout with the coronavirus in early October, during which time he was taken to Walter Reed Medical Center and given a variety of treatments, including an experimental drug cocktail and a steroid with mood-altering side effects.

Despite this, Trump did not relinquish control over the nation’s nuclear arsenal throughout the episode. This raised eyebrows in the national security community, where many thought the president should temporarily delegate nuclear authority to the vice president, as other chief executives have done in the past.

“To state the obvious, we should not entrust nuclear launch authority to someone who is not fully lucid,” Ploughshares Fund’s Tom Collina wrote in an op-ed published by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. “A nuclear crisis can happen at any time, including at the worst possible time. If such a crisis takes place when a president’s thinking is compromised for any reason, the results could be catastrophic.” 

Collina and Perry argued that the reason we still tolerate sole authority anyway has to do with two sweeping myths about the nuclear weapons system. 

“The first myth is the reason we have sole authority and can’t possibly get away from it is because we need the president to make a decision about nuclear launch within minutes,” Collina explained on a recent episode of Press the Button. This line of thinking argues that the speed and accuracy of adversary intercontinental ballistic missiles require that U.S. missiles immediately get airborne, otherwise they risk being destroyed in the ground. 

But according to Collina, this logic falls apart when you play it out. “Let’s say that there is an alert that hundreds of nuclear weapons are coming in,” he said. “There are two options, that’s it’s a false alarm or it’s real. If it’s a false alarm, the last thing you want to do is launch quickly, because then the United States has just started a nuclear war.”

“If it’s real, our launching quickly will not stop that attack.” But neither will that attack prevent a devastating US counterstrike. In any conceivable scenario, the American fleet of nuclear submarines would still be at large, ready to launch a massive retaliatory blow hours or even days later. In other words, we simply would not need the president to make a frantic decision on the spot. 

The second myth surrounds a “very persistent misunderstanding that the military brass can step in and stop” a nuclear launch order from an unhinged president. This gets the danger fundamentally wrong, said Perry and Collina. “People tend to think about a president in the middle of the day, with no international crisis, just deciding to launch the nukes,” the latter explained. “That’s not a very realistic scenario.” 

“The scenario we’re most worried about is there is an alert that we’re under attack, so we have a time crunch scenario,” said Collina. “And in that kind of situation it’s very unlikely that, if the president were to decide to launch, the military brass would try and slow that process down.” 

It also intrinsically misunderstands the relationship between the military and the president, argued the former defense secretary—even in a non-crisis scenario. “The military stepping in is a highly unlikely scenario,” said Perry. The air force officers tasked with actually launching the intercontinental ballistic missiles would be “very unlikely to challenge [the president’s] order.”

“They understand that the president has access to information that they do not have access to, and that’s why he has the authority instead of them,” he continued. “And so, if they think there’s something wrong with his command, the first thing they think is that ‘this is because the president knows something I don’t know.’” 

Taken together, said Perry and Collina, the truth behind these myths reveals that there is neither a strategic need for—nor any real safeguard against—presidential sole authority over the nuclear arsenal. This reality should push the public towards common-sense reform. 

“We have to ask ourselves, at what point does a president’s inability to think clearly affect his ability to have nuclear authority?” Collina asked. “And more broadly, should the president have that authority at all?” 

“Why did we trust, in this case, the future of the world to one person with COVID on heavy medication? Does that make sense?”

Zack Brown is a policy associate at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation. 

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Donald Trump’s Real North Korea Mistake | Cato Institute

Posted by M. C. on February 22, 2020

The necessity of trying to reduce that risk impels the United States to continue pursuing the chimera of getting North Korea to renounce its nukes and missiles. As I’ve written elsewhere, Pyongyang is extremely unlikely ever to abide by those demands. Those weapons are the North Korean government’s ace in the hole to prevent the United States from trying to replicate the forcible regime‐​change strategy it pursued in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere.

https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/donald-trumps-real-north-korea-mistake

By Ted Galen Carpenter

This article appeared on The National Interest (Online) on Feburary 18, 2020.
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President Trump needs to take advantage of his strengthened political position following the impeachment fiasco to keep his 2016 campaign promises about reassessing obsolete American military alliances. Unfortunately, thus far his approach has consisted of little more than empty talk. In terms of substance, Washington’s policies toward its NATO and East Asian allies have shifted very little. The administration’s principal change efforts have focused on demanding greater financial burden‐​sharing from its treaty partners in both regions.

That approach has worked only to a very limited extent. As Trump pointed out in his State of the Union address, the number of European NATO members meeting the agreed‐​upon target of spending two percent of their annual gross domestic product on defense has doubled during his administration. He neglected to mention, though, that the overwhelming majority of members still have not reached that target.

His track record with South Korea and Japan is not much better. In November 2019, the administration reportedly demanded that Seoul make a five‐​fold increase in its $900 million annual support payments for U.S. troops stationed in the ROK. Washington also pressed Tokyo to quadruple its $2 billion support payment. Both allies strongly resisted that pressure, and likely viewed the demands as a bluff. As with earlier calls for greater burden‐​sharing by the NATO allies going back decades, U.S. leaders have never exhibited a credible willingness to withdraw U.S. forces if the calls were spurned. Allied governments seem confident that the situation is no different this time.

Even in the unlikely event that they did accept Washington’s demands, the objective of financial burden‐​sharing fails to understand the real problem with U.S. foreign policy. The more fundamental problem is that the costs and risks of America’s alliance obligations now outweigh the prospective benefits—and the gap is growing rapidly. That situation is graphically apparent with respect to Washington’s security commitments in East Asia—especially to South Korea. The “mutual” defense treaty with Seoul entails the risk of a U.S. military confrontation with North Korea. That was perilous enough when Pyongyang lacked any nuclear capability, much less the capacity to strike the American homeland. Both conditions have now changed.

It should be puzzling, frustrating, and alarming to all Americans that the United States is still on front lines of any crisis involving North Korea. That dangerous, unrewarding role arose in a different era under very different circumstances. Washington’s commitment to defend South Korea from the communist North reflected the pervasive view among U.S. policymakers that the world was bipolar strategically, and that any victory by a Soviet or Communist Chinese client would be a dangerous setback for the United States and its “free world” allies. Thus, U.S. leaders deemed keeping the noncommunist Republic of Korea (ROK) out of the clutches of international communism important to America’s own strategic interests.

Whatever the logic of such a commitment in a bipolar Cold War setting, circumstances have changed dramatically over the past three decades. Unlike the backing that Moscow and Beijing provided to Pyongyang when the communist regime launched its military offensive in 1950 to conquer the ROK and unify the Korean Peninsula under communist rule, both China and noncommunist Russia have no desire for a second Korean war—or even a boost in tensions in the region. Even in the unlikely scenario that North Korea intends to invade the South again, Seoul’s vast economic advantage over its rival means that the ROK can build whatever forces it needs to deter or defeat such a conventional military threat. It also can choose to build a nuclear deterrent to offset anything Pyongyang does in that area.

While North Korean leaders would logically regard as credible a determination by South Korea to defend itself, their assessment of a U.S. commitment to risk the American homeland to defend a small ally is far less certain. Uncertainty about credibility has always been a problem with the entire concept of extended deterrence. In any case, the existence of a North Korean nuclear arsenal and the growing reach of Pyongyang’s ballistic missiles markedly increase the risk level to the United State of maintaining the defense commitment to Seoul.

The necessity of trying to reduce that risk impels the United States to continue pursuing the chimera of getting North Korea to renounce its nukes and missiles. As I’ve written elsewhere, Pyongyang is extremely unlikely ever to abide by those demands. Those weapons are the North Korean government’s ace in the hole to prevent the United States from trying to replicate the forcible regime‐​change strategy it pursued in Iraq, Libya, and elsewhere. Consequently, the risk level to the United States of trying to maintain its defense commitment to South Korea is certain to rise, not fall, in the coming years.

In a normal international system, the neighbors of a difficult and menacing state would have the primary incentive and obligation to deal with that country. The United States should take steps consistent with that realization. It is absurd for America to remain be on the front lines of a simmering crisis in a region thousands of miles from home, when other powers have far more at stake.

Washington can normalize its relations with Pyongyang—signing a treaty formally ending the Korean War, establishing formal diplomatic ties, and eliminating most unilateral economic sanctions—without persisting in the futile strategy of leading a multilateral effort to (somehow) induce Pyongyang to return to nuclear virginity. The Trump administration should make that dramatic policy shift. As it moves toward a normal relationship with Pyongyang, Washington should also inform South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia that the United States no longer intends to be on the front lines of trying to manage Northeast Asia’s security environment. South Korean President Moon Jae‐​in already has taken initiatives for détente between his country and North Korea, and he has achieved modest success. Washington should strongly encourage such moves by South Korea and other countries in the region instead of impeding them.

Because of geographic proximity and other factors, maintaining peace in that region should be far more crucial to North Korea’s neighbors than to the United States. It’s time for them to assume the necessary responsibilities and incur the accompanying risks. Donald Trump should at long last make his alleged willingness to change policies regarding America’s obsolete alliances a reality. Korea is a good (indeed, necessary) place to start.

 

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There’s One Way to Stop Trump From Acting on Nuclear Threats – Truthdig

Posted by M. C. on August 2, 2019

Nuclear modernization, adjustable yield nukes, Iran invasion…what did the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee think the plan was?

They are just figuring this out? I don’t think so.

This is more anti-Trump. At least anti-Trump out trumps nuclear war.

Just imagine if the war machine (Hillary) won.

This government runs on war.

https://www.truthdig.com/articles/theres-one-way-to-stop-trump-from-making-good-on-nuclear-threats/

Scott Ritter

On July 22, during a meeting at the White House with Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, President Trump alluded to military plans in which the U.S. could “win the war” in Afghanistan in a matter of days. “I could win that war in a week, I just don’t want to kill 10 million people,” Trump said. “Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth.”

Trump did not explicitly say what weapons would be used to achieve this outcome. However, his comments implicitly invoked the use of nuclear weapons, the only military resource in the U.S. arsenal capable of killing that many people in such a short time. While it is highly unlikely President Trump reviewed any such plans regarding Afghanistan (he has been known to lie on occasion), the fact that he chose to mention a scenario that invoked a massive U.S. nuclear strike sent a signal to Afghanistan’s neighbor, Iran, that when it comes to resolving the ongoing crisis over Iran’s nuclear program, all options were, indeed, on the table.

Americans have become accustomed to presidents capable of rationally managing the awesome power of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, dating back to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. For two weeks in October 1962, the world was on the verge of global nuclear annihilation. President Kennedy was under pressure from the Pentagon to use military force to prevent the Soviet Union from installing nuclear-armed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on the island that would threaten much of the southern and eastern United States. Nuclear war was ultimately averted; Kennedy disregarded the advice of the military chiefs, opting instead to rely upon diplomacy.

One of the factors that weighed on Kennedy was the consequences of a nuclear conflict. In July 1961, Kennedy had been briefed for the first time on the U.S. nuclear war plan. After hearing an estimated 48 to 71 million people in the U.S. would be “killed outright,” with another 67 million in Russia and 76 million in China likewise perishing, Kennedy said to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “And we call ourselves the human race.” That moral rejection of nuclear mass murder became the standard that had guided successive presidents when it came to nuclear conflict.

Until Donald Trump.

Trump’s casual reference to murdering 10 million Afghans wasn’t the first time he had threatened to use nuclear weapons in a precipitous fashion. In August 2017, while responding to statements made by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump declared that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire, fury and frankly power the likes of which this world has never seen before.”

On Nov. 14, 2017, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee did something it hadn’t done in 41 years—addressed the authority to use nuclear weapons. In convening that hearing, the Republican chairman, Sen. Bob Corker, observed, “Making the decision to go to war of any sort is a heavy responsibility for our nation’s elected leaders, and the decision to use nuclear weapons is the most consequential of all.” His Democratic counterpart, Sen. Ben Cardin, added in his opening remarks, “Given today’s challenges, we need to revisit this question on whether a single individual should have the sole and unchecked authority to launch a nuclear attack under all circumstances, including the right to use it as a first strike.”

But the event that prompted the U.S. Senate to convene such a rare hearing wasn’t casual curiosity about U.S. nuclear launch authority, but rather the words of President Trump regarding North Korea. Cardin noted in his opening remarks that, in reference to Trump’s statement, “many interpret that to mean that the president is actively considering the use of nuclear weapons in order to deal with the threat of North Korea. That is frightening.”…

Two things emerge from this narrative. First and foremost, the Senate was wrong in believing that international law provided a basis for internal checks and balances within the U.S. military that could justify opposition to a nuclear strike against Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities. Second, the Senate based its assessment of the role played by the policy enshrined in the Nuclear Posture Review on a document from 2010 that has since been superseded. By broadening the “extreme circumstances” under which the use of nuclear weapons could be justified, the 2018 NPR opened the door for President Trump to follow through with his threat of “obliteration.” And the Senate let it happen.

President Trump’s offhand threat to murder 10 million Afghans should serve as a wake-up call for those in the U.S. Congress, Republicans and Democrats alike, who are concerned about the future not only of the United States, but all humanity. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should reconvene its hearing on the authority to use nuclear weapons and rectify its past mistakes by putting forward legislation that precludes any first use of nuclear weapons by the United States—period. While nuclear weapons continue to exist in the world, there is a role to be played by a viable nuclear enterprise that serves as a deterrent against any nation using its nuclear arsenal in support of aggression. There is also a role for these nations to recognize the suicidal futility inherent in any use of nuclear weapons.

It is intolerable for the United States to seek to leverage its nuclear arsenal for any purpose other than to deter the use of nuclear weapons. There is simply no non-nuclear threat that can inflict enough damage to provide reciprocal cover for the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation. By embracing a nuclear employment doctrine that permits the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear scenario, the United States legitimizes the possession of these weapons in a way that is unacceptable in a world that supposedly embraces the tenets of nuclear nonproliferation. It is the role of Congress to correct flawed policy, and this role can best be implemented by modifying the existing war powers authorities granted the resident as commander in chief to exclude in perpetuity the ability to use nuclear weapons in any situation other than responding to a nuclear attack.

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