MCViewPoint

Opinion from a Libertarian ViewPoint

Posts Tagged ‘Rothbardian’

Are You an Enemy of the State?

Posted by M. C. on January 17, 2024

By George F. Smith

Paine lacked even the distinction of being regarded as a hero.  As I wrote in an earlier essay, “The man who inspired the country to secede from a corrupt state had six people in attendance at his funeral [in 1809], none of whom were dignitaries.”

Much later, Teddy “warmonger” Roosevelt famously described Paine as “a filthy little Atheist.”  It was a false characterization, but most people neither know nor care that it is.

Donald Trump, Julian Assange, Alex Jones, and Rudy Gulianni are in deep trouble with the US state.  How about you?

Most likely you feel safe because your voice hasn’t attracted a large following.  What would the state’s enforcers gain by attacking a little guy?  They’re big game hunters.  Pull the plug on the big guys and their everyday followers float away like bathtub water down a drain.

Possibly you believe you aren’t really attacking the state with your social media posts, just the corrupt regime currently in power.  As long as your words don’t go too far off the rails you think trouble will leave you alone.

That’s the theory, at least.

Most libertarians are not Rothbardians.  They think the state is necessary but needs to be slashed, not done away with —  much like the heroic Javier Milei is doing in Argentina.  Their comfort zone is a minimalist state, and they write or lecture from that position.  As such these people are explicit defenders of the state per se and therefore cannot be considered enemies of the state.

The SWAT team hacking at your door could care less.

Why would they pick on you, an inconspicuous promoter of seditious thoughts?  The big guys have money and influence to defend themselves.  You have nothing.   You would be at their mercy, and they have no mercy.  Would you stand your ground or crumble like a shack during a hurricane?  Would you wave your First Amendment rights at their weapons or would you forget your own name?  Your story would shake the social media world, exactly their reason for attacking you.

Is it really worth your life defying the state?

In June 1989 Tank Man stood in front of a column of Chinese tanks as they advanced on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to crush a student protest.  No one knows who he was or what happened to him.  Yet for a few tense minutes he stopped the progression of the tanks by holding his hand up before being swept away by Chinese officials.  He did this in daylight, while in full public view.  Most people are asleep at six in the morning when the SWAT boys come knocking.

Don’t think being an unarmed senior citizen will protect you.  Or a 5’2” unarmed woman.  As Dr. Simone Gold told Lifesite News,

It was dramatic and what I want to say is that I weep for our country. If you can pull in a person like me … [and] have the FBI break down your door with 20 guns, shackle you [in] handcuffs [and] drag you off, I mean it was really terrible … I’m telling you America, this can happen to you.

The firebrand Thomas Paine

See the rest here

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A Rejoinder to Jeff Deist on CHAZ | Mises Institute

Posted by M. C. on June 18, 2020

My motto in matters of this sort is the following: “If it moves, privatize it; if it does not move, privatize it. Since everything either moves or does not move, privatize everything. A CHAZ undertaken by Rothbardians is a move in the right direction.

 

https://mises.org/power-market/rejoinder-jeff-deist-chaz?utm_source=Mises+Institute+Subscriptions&utm_campaign=08ac95970a-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_9_21_2018_9_59_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_8b52b2e1c0-08ac95970a-228343965

Walter Block

The Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) is an area of several city blocks in Seattle that has been taken over by a group of people unconnected with the government. They have established a police-free zone and are now busily administering this territory.

Is this a voluntary socialist commune? A free enterprise zone? Are the new inhabitants who have seized control of the area legitimate homesteaders or illegal squatters, that is, trespassers? Who are now the proper owners of this acreage, of the buildings, roads, parks, and houses therein?

From a libertarian perspective, we must first distinguish between (previously) city government–owned property and that of the private storekeepers, homeowners, and other private citizens. As to the latter, the analysis is easy: they should remain in control of their property, and if the CHAZ folk interfere with their continued use of these possessions of theirs, they are in the wrong. But what about public property? CHAZ now possesses the streets, police stations, libraries, museums, post offices, parks, opera houses, and other assets previously in government hands. Who, now, has a right to take charge of all of these goods?

Suppose we were privatizing this area under Rothbardian rules. Who would obtain which government assets? “Homesteading” and “Rothbard” are not synonyms in the English language, but in the present context they might as well be. All of these resources would belong to the owners of private property in the area. However, there is one difficulty in concluding that control of this material properly belongs to them and not to the CHAZites: these locals did nothing to claim ownership. They did not lift a finger in objection to governmental property in their area. One part of homesteading, to be sure, is to “mix one’s labor” with virgin territory. But, another is to declare ownership. Rather, the CHAZers did precisely that. They actually seized control of illicit statist property. At the very least then, even if the previous owners were to be given a portion of these statist goods, the CHAZ people would certainly be owed what might be considered a “finder’s fee.”

Of course, implicit in the Rothbardian notion of homesteading is that it is open to just about anyone, except for criminals. The actual possessors of CHAZ, as of this writing, are members of Antifa, a criminal organization, guilty of vast mayhem, looting of private property, assault, threats, etc. So they cannot be the proper owners of the goods in question. But suppose that instead of Antifa a group of Rothbardians took on this role (we pass quickly over the point that the powers that be in Seattle and Washington State, although looking on somewhat askance but also benignly at CHAZ, would crush without mercy any free enterprisers who acted as they have, in a similar manner to what happened to David Koresh in Waco).

Would the ownership of the libertarian CHAZers be legitimate, not of the private hotels, restaurants, shops, houses, and condos in this six-block area, but, rather, of the public facilities? It is difficult to see why not. After all, according to strict
Rothbardianism, these amenities are not—cannot be—legitimately owned by a coercive government. If this is so, then they are unowned and therefore available for the taking by the next homesteader to come down the pike. And that would be this passel of hypothetical Rothbardians, not the owners of the private facilities who long acquiesced in paying compulsory taxes to support them.

Another theory, prevalent in libertarian circles on this matter, has been put forth by Hans-Hermann Hoppe and by Jeff Deist in this recent article. In this Hoppean view, the proper owners of the government roads, streets, parks, libraries, museums, etc., are not the libertarian homesteaders. They are but trespassers. No, the appropriate titleholders are the long-suffering taxpayers. And which organization is their agent? Why, the very government that has long been abusing them in this manner.

The Hoppean solution to the problem is open to several objections. First, Hoppe is a world-class anarcho-capitalist. There is at least a certain tension, not to say a blatant self-contradiction, in such a scholar holding out the state apparatus as the agent of the tax victims. No, the government is not their agent; it is their abuser. Hoppe here is in the unenviable position of taking on the role of a progovernment anarchist. So much for deontology.

Second, this thesis also faces a pragmatic difficulty. Remember, the would-be homesteaders here are all Rothbardians. They will attempt to engage contractually with the home and business owners along the hypothetical lines of what would have occurred had free enterprise been the order of the day right before the time of settlement. For example, the road owners will not charge the locals gigantic fees for usage of their holdings to the locals. Rather, they will require an amount that would have arisen had they attracted businesses to locate along their thoroughfares before anyone had located there. This hypothetical fee level would have been voluntarily agreed upon. And, ditto for use of the parks and other features of the urban landscape.

But Hoppe’s theory would say nay to these arrangements. This author would place in charge, as their “agent,” the very institution responsible for the deviation from pure Rothbardianism in the first place. Thus, the implication of Hoppe’s theory would be a very conservative one, conservative in the worst sense. What would be conserved, in this view? It would be the reinstitution of government control over these premises. The anarcho-libertarian homesteaders would be considered illegal squatters and arrested for their supposed violation of private property rights—the roads, parks, etc., presumably owned by the taxpayers. To see the falsity of this, let one of these citizens try to sleep in a government park or library overnight; he will soon become acquainted with their real owner. It is not him. Not even close. Under Hoppeanism, there would be no way for the ancap libertarians to “seize the streets.” The roadways would be forever in the hands of the evil state.

That is not the libertarianism of the Rothbard variety. (I full well acknowledge that Rothbard himself would not allow the “bum” in the public library. He would side with Hoppe in this matter. I speak here, then, of the platonic version of Rothbardianism that would exult in such a ruination of public property.) Either we take the libertarian rejection of public property seriously, or we do not. If the latter, we reduce the power and accuracy of this philosophy. My motto in matters of this sort is the following: “If it moves, privatize it; if it does not move, privatize it. Since everything either moves or does not move, privatize everything. A CHAZ undertaken by Rothbardians is a move in the right direction.

 

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bionic mosquito: Natural Law and Anarcho-Capitalism

Posted by M. C. on June 6, 2020

https://bionicmosquito.blogspot.com/2020/06/natural-law-and-anarcho-capitalism.html#more

The purpose of this paper is to give an analysis and explication of the notion of a natural order of human affairs, which is logically independent of any metaphysical or theological system.

In this paper, Frank van Dun (FvD) offers an examination of Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism and its presupposition of a natural order – based on natural law and natural rights.

In short, anarcho-capitalism, in its Rothbardian form, stands or falls with its supposition that there is a natural order – a natural law – of the human world and that each human person has a place in that order that is delimited by his or her natural rights.

It is important that van Dun clarifies that he is dealing with a Rothbardian order, as others base their anarcho-capitalism or libertarianism on foundations other than natural law. Rothbard’s version is not driven by views on efficiency, but on views of human beings as human beings.

It is important, therefore to examine just what is meant by natural law – at least as van Dun sees it. As he notes, “‘Natural law’ is a controversial concept.” One reason it is controversial is that it is often connected to the metaphysical, or otherwise connected to a particular theology. While one cannot escape Aquinas when discussing natural law, this certainly does not make it a Catholic convention – or invention.

However, the fact that some theories of natural law are metaphysical or theological does not mean that natural law is something metaphysical or theological. A theory of mice and men can be metaphysical but the metaphysics is in the theory, not in the mice and not in the men.

FvD then dives into a very important point – one that I have often made, yet still find misunderstood. Natural law legal theory and natural law ethical theory need not be identical. Such thinking results in an unnecessary either / or situation:

…either all natural laws are mere moral admonitions or all of them are legally enforceable requirements. That ambiguity has plagued the interpretation of natural law theories ever since Thomas Aquinas identified natural law and reason.

Natural law: either suggestions for ethical behavior or a system by which to implement a theocracy. But neither extreme is necessary, and in any case not at all intended by Aquinas. Forgive the very long cite, but this is a tremendously important point:

…Thomas clearly distinguished between mere sins (that merit disapproval and repentance) and injustices (that merit ‘action in justice’ and redress). He also distinguished between vices of the sort no virtuous man would engage in and vices that threaten the existence of ‘society’ (not this or that particular society but ‘human society’ as a general form of conviviality or symbiosis): murder, arson, theft, fraud, robbery, assault and other crimes against persons and property. (Summa Theologica, IaIIae, question 96, art.2 (concl). Only with respect to injustice and especially crime can the coercive power of ‘human law’ intervene. In short, while all virtues are necessarily lawful (sanctioned by the rational appreciation of their agreement with divine providence), and all vices are consequently unlawful, only a few vices of a particular sort should be made illegal. ‘Legislating morality’ was not on Thomas’ agenda.

FvD uses the terms “unlawful” and “illegal” to make the distinction. Unlawful being a violation of natural law; illegal being a violation that gets you thrown in prison (or justifies violence in response).

This is consistent with my point that the non-aggression principle fits quite well as a theory of punishment, but not as a theory of ethics. Violations of the natural law that are also aggressions against person or property are subject to the “coercive power of human law.” Non-aggressive violations of the natural law are not, in my opinion, subject to this same coercive power.

I will leave aside, as it is rough around the edges and will be dictated by local custom as much as any other factor, the specific application of the word “aggression.” I don’t think the edges of this term are identifiable by evermore purifying attempts at applying libertarian theory. Human beings don’t work that way. Different societies will figure this out in a way that works for them.

FvD next looks at a comparison of natural law and artificial law. Whether in physics, biology, or chemistry, science attempts to identify the natural order of things. It is no different when working to identify the natural order of persons. This order exists, waiting to be discovered, based on the characteristics of human beings as human beings.

 

This as opposed to artificial law: “An artificial law is an order of artificial things. Here we shall consider it only as an order of artificial persons.” FvD offers as an example, the artificial person known as a “citizen.” States and corporations also qualify. These are defined by the relevant artificial law.

To find out about natural persons, go live among them; to find out about citizens, consult a lawyer!

A breakdown in artificial law happens when people refuse to play by the rules. This could be because they refuse to do so (including for reasons that the rules violate natural law) or when the rules are overly complex and ever-changing. A breakdown of natural law happens when people do not heed the distinction of one person from another. (Egalitarianism in all its forms, run amok.)

What of any obligation for a person to respect the natural law? This, van Dun suggests, is an open question requiring serious thought:

What a natural person can do does not translate into what he may do. What such a person ought to do does not translate into what he must do.

How I see this: A natural person can punch someone in the nose for no good reason; it does not follow that he may do this. A natural person ought not live in a drunken stupor; yet this says nothing about what he must do regarding the consumption of alcohol.

Such an is-ought question is not an issue at all for artificial persons and artificial law. Here, the law is whatever the law is, and the person is whatever the law makes him to be. This is positivism, and it is clear why positivism is anathema to anarcho-capitalists – and many libertarians. Positivism ignores, and even denies, the idea of natural law.

Conclusion

In this paper, van Dun is not attempting to justify natural law, only to examine it and its relationship to anarcho-capitalism. He concludes:

Anarcho-capitalism rests on the notion of natural law as an order of natural persons rather than a binding set of rules or commands. As a normative theory, it holds not only that we have good reasons to respect the natural order but also that we have no right not to respect it.

Building liberty on any other foundation is flawed; it is not sustainable. Only this foundation of natural law takes human beings as they are, not as someone wishes them to be.

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