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Posts Tagged ‘Central Planners’
Central Planners Are Misguided Human Beings — They NEVER HAVE And NEVER WILL Run The World
Posted by M. C. on December 17, 2022
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Life Is Dynamic & Spontaneous — Central Planners Try (And Fail) To Make It Static
Posted by M. C. on November 21, 2022
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Central Planners Don’t Have A Clue, So Don’t Trust The Fed
Posted by M. C. on August 7, 2021
Central planning always fails, without exception. Civilization is never created from a blueprint developed in the imaginations of a few elitists. In fact, it’s the exact opposite. Civilization is always destroyed by central planners. So why do people constantly find themselves suffering under the yolk of utopians, when the only possible endgame is failure?
Central Planning = distortion and disaster
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Pennsylvania Is Playing Politics with Drug Rationing | Mises Wire
Posted by M. C. on August 10, 2020
Just as a reminder of the kind of central planners we are dealing with, this is the same Pennsylvania Department of Health that decreed on May 12 that nursing homes “must continue to take new admissions, if appropriate beds are available, and a suspected or confirmed positive for COVID-19 is not a reason to deny admission.” Months later, nearly 70 percent of coronavirus fatalities in the state have occurred in nursing homes.
Not being content with causing such a disaster, the state health department has issued guidance on how healthcare facilities should ration the limited supply of the new drug Remdesivir in the event that there are not enough doses to go around,
The middle of a pandemic is no time for social engineering, but it is also not a time for state involvement in healthcare to begin with. That involvement has led to thousands of nursing home patients dying and has now led to a blatant redistributionist drug-rationing scheme. Further involvement is only going to make matters worse and continue to poison a crucial aspect of our lives with politics even more than it already is.
“Never let a crisis go to waste,” the old adage goes, and the coronavirus fiasco has demonstrated this principle in action more times than one can count. From declarations of veritable society-wide house arrest to crazed government spending and monetary policy, there has been no shortage of opportunistic actors working to live out their dreams of power and dominion over others that “normal” times would not allow. Another such instance of gleeful advantage taking has come to light in the form of the Pennsylvania Department of Health’s “Ethical Allocation Framework for Emerging Treatments of COVID-19” guideline, a document that barely conceals its authors’ desire to use the current fiasco as an opportunity to engage in their own schemes of egalitarian social engineering.
Just as a reminder of the kind of central planners we are dealing with, this is the same Pennsylvania Department of Health that decreed on May 12 that nursing homes “must continue to take new admissions, if appropriate beds are available, and a suspected or confirmed positive for COVID-19 is not a reason to deny admission.” Months later, nearly 70 percent of coronavirus fatalities in the state have occurred in nursing homes.
Not being content with causing such a disaster, the state health department has issued guidance on how healthcare facilities should ration the limited supply of the new drug Remdesivir in the event that there are not enough doses to go around, but notes that the guidelines should apply to any scarce form of treatment. While certainly an unpleasant subject to address, it is true that in the face of scarcity the limited supply of Remdesivir or any other treatment will need to be rationed and that some kind of method of choosing will be needed. Scarcity is simply a fact of life that must be dealt with. However, because the distribution of Remdisivir has been taken over by the federal government, which distributes it to state governments, which in turn distribute it to healthcare providers, the process has unavoidably become political.
Putting all the jargon aside, the guideline is very clear about several points. First, it is not considered acceptable to distribute care via a random lottery, or on a first-come-first-served basis. Rather, healthcare providers must take into consideration “community-benefit” when rationing care and the department recommends the use of a weighted lottery system.
As you can see, the example lottery that the health department provides uses three different criteria to determine how a patient’s lottery chance is weighted: membership in a disadvantaged community, being an essential worker, and likelihood of death in the next year.
While the state’s determination of who is and who is not an essential worker is arbitrary and has been full of problems, one can at least see the logic behind such a consideration, as well as for those patients who are not likely to live much longer, although one must question where the state gets the authority to dictate such things to hospitals.
What raises the most concern is the idea that members of “disadvantaged communities” should be given a better chance at receiving treatment than others. According to the guidance, because “low-income communities and certain racial/ethnic minorities” are being disproportionately burdened by the coronavirus, the end goal of public health is served by benefitting some groups over others. According to the guidance, “the rationale is that a core goal of public health is to redress inequities that make health and safety less accessible to disadvantaged groups.”
One might have thought that the main goal of public health was to save as many lives as possible. But instead, it seems that the state department of health considers the emergency room to be the perfect place to start “mitigating the structural inequities that cause certain communities to bear the greatest burden during the pandemic.”
This formulation makes it unclear what the guidance means when it states that the first goal of the ethical framework is “to safeguard the public’s health by allocating scarce treatments to maximize community benefit.” Does community benefit mean saving as many lives as possible? Or is it some kind of grievance studies conception of equality where arriving at a more “equally distributed” survival rate based on race and socioeconomic status is the goal?
One can certainly argue that certain populations do not have very good access to healthcare resources, but it seems outrageous to think that the time to attempt to remedy such inequality is when triaging patients.
Similarly concerning is the way the guidance recommends that the treating physicians be removed from the rationing process and that it be left in the hands of hospital bureaucrats instead, effectively tying doctors’ hands to treat their patients. Is this the kind of state-run healthcare that we have to look forward to in the future? Doctors as helpless as their patients as bureaucrats “assess” a patient’s social suitability to be worthy of treatment?
The guidance goes on to recommend some procedures for how membership in a “disadvantaged community” should be determined. After noting that both members of low-income communities and racial minorities have been adversely affected by the virus and therefore deserve an increased chance of receiving treatment, the racial component drops entirely from consideration in recommendations, no doubt because such discrimination would be highly illegal and result in a torrent of lawsuits against the state and any hospital foolish enough to try it. The guideline is explicit that “no one is excluded from access based on age, disability, religion, race, ethnicity, national origin, immigration status, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity and to ensure that no one is denied access based on stereotypes, perceived quality of life, or judgments about a person’s worth.” However, one can’t help but think that if racial discrimination were not illegal the logic of this guidance would dictate that it be undertaken in the name of “equality.”
What that list is lacking is a prohibition on discrimination based on socioeconomic status, which is the method the guidance suggests should be used for the purposes of weighing the lottery. Specifically, it recommends the use of the Area Deprivation Index, which is based on data from the 2015 American Community Survey. Hospitals would use the index’s Neighborhood Atlas to enter a patient’s address and determine if they are a disadvantaged community member.
One can’t help but feel that such a system is arbitrary to the extreme. When I entered my address into the Neighborhood Atlas I discovered that no one in my neighborhood would receive any weighted advantage if Remdisivir were needed. However, when I Google mapped the distance between my home and the nearest sector considered to be disadvantaged, I discovered that it was a mere two-minute drive away. Can anything based on something so arbitrary as five-year-old aggregated census block data be considered a useful tool for the fair rationing of treatment?
This entire scheme is just a taste of the ways medical care would be infected with politics if it were to be run by the government. In a system of socialized medicine would we see similar redistributionist schemes of rationing introduced? No doubt, many people of all political persuasions would view it as a fertile field for attempts at social engineering. Similarly, it is not hard to see politicians scheming to ensure that favored constituents and voting blocs have access to care at the expense of their opponent’s supporters, or that whole classes of people are purposefully and consciously disadvantaged based on whoever holds the keys to power at the moment.
The middle of a pandemic is no time for social engineering, but it is also not a time for state involvement in healthcare to begin with. That involvement has led to thousands of nursing home patients dying and has now led to a blatant redistributionist drug-rationing scheme. Further involvement is only going to make matters worse and continue to poison a crucial aspect of our lives with politics even more than it already is.
Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: Central Planners, Drug Rationing, essential worker, Ethical Allocation Framework, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Health | Leave a Comment »
Markets Rely on Accurate and Honest Information — But Governments Want the Opposite | Mises Wire
Posted by M. C. on October 6, 2019
In contrast, when governments displace voluntary arrangements with coercive impositions, lies displace truth in two ways. Not only is the competition to get political power based largely on misrepresentations, but government’s coercive impositions also replace the truth revealed in voluntary market behavior with lies. What is the effect on society? It isn’t pretty.
…The reason people don’t always communicate truthfully is that our reason serves our self-interest. Sometimes we perceive a strategic advantage at other people’s expense from intentionally deceiving them. Our words are also often ex post rationalizations to ourselves and others of why whatever we chose or did was a good idea. But that often makes what people say a frail reed to rely upon. And when political power is involved, the incentives for such deception and self-delusion are put on steroids, because the payoffs are far greater when backed by government’s coercive power.
As a consequence, accurate information about the issues most important to our ability to co-operate with others is often among the scarcest and most valuable of goods. Making it worse, the unknowably vast amount of potentially useful information—the infinite permutations of who, what, when, where, why and how–exceeds any individual or group’s ability to comprehend and integrate it. But voluntary market arrangements based on private property rights provide a powerful mechanism of cutting that problem down to manageable size.
Most of the time, we don’t really want to know all the details that might affect our productive interactions with others. We mainly want to know “how much”–what are the tradeoffs others are willing to make between goods, services, current versus future consumption, labor versus leisure, etc. The reason is that, regardless of their specific determinants, others’ willing tradeoffs determine our possibilities and constraints in any society that honors members’ self-ownership.
Expanding the mutually beneficial arrangements that are possible by accurately revealing such information is a central aspect of effective social coordination, as the seminal works of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek have made clear. No central planners knows the tradeoffs each individual would make; only the individuals involved know that information. That requires a process to honestly reveal that information to those who will make choices regarding it, or the information will be effectively thrown away, along with the societal wealth creation it would enable.
Markets provide that honest information. While what people say may often be misleading to themselves and others, people reveal the truth about the tradeoffs they are willing to make when they engage in un-coerced exchange. What you do is often far more truthful than what you say.
Regardless of your words, if you actually buy a product for $10 out of your pocket, you reveal that you believe it is worth at least $10 to you; similarly, if you sell a product for $10, you reveal that what the money could purchase was worth more to you than the product. And those choices reveal valuable information about the real alternatives available to those who might choose to deal with you. In contrast, since politics is based on what people say rather than what they actually do, it often short-circuits our central mechanism for discovering the truth to better enable our cooperative potential.
In fact, a vast array of government interference in individuals’ voluntary exchange relationships substitutes lies for the truth that would otherwise be revealed. And in a world where relative scarcities are frequently the primary things we want to know from others, to combine with our more intimate knowledge of ourselves and our situations, the harm is massive.
Consider price ceilings, like rent controls. In their absence, market rents tell you the prices at which you can find apartments, reflecting the opportunity costs landlords face. But rent controls impose a price divorced from landlords’ opportunity costs, and at which many will often be unable to successfully rent an apartment. That is, it misinforms people that the opportunity costs are cheaper than they really are, and in the process makes knowledge of the terms at which apartments can generally be successfully rented largely disappear.
Price floors, like minimum wages, act in a parallel manner. In their absence, market wages tell you the prices at which you can generally find jobs. But a minimum wage dictates a price divorced from prospective workers’ opportunity costs, and at which many will often be unable to successfully get jobs. That is, it misinforms people that unskilled labor’s opportunity costs are higher than they really are, and in the process makes the knowledge of the terms at which jobs can generally successfully be gotten largely disappear.
Taxes, which are the price of the artificial input, “government permission to produce and sell,” reflecting coercively imposed government burdens rather than opportunity costs of inherently scarce goods and services, tell buyers that products are scarcer than they really are. The same is true of import restrictions, like tariffs and quotas, which raise prices above opportunity costs. The burdens of government regulations and mandates also act like taxes. Government barriers to entry and operation in markets similarly raise prices above what relative scarcity would dictate. All of these result in artificially higher prices, underuse and waste, compared to free markets.
Subsidies act in a parallel manner to taxes, but in the opposite direction. They communicate to prospective buyers that products are less scarce than they really are, leading to artificially low prices to consumers, overuse and waste, compared to free markets.
Not only do voluntary market interactions better reveal the truth about relative scarcities through pricing, they allow more accurate evaluation of other aspects of trading, such as product and service quality, than government.
The key (though often ignored) factor is repeat business. The usual scare stories to justify the “need” for government regulation involve one-time interactions, in which others can gain by “cheating” on what they promise. But the relevant question is not whether they can, but whether it is in their interest to do so. We don’t need government protection against things people will choose not to do, even if they could. And since almost everyone we deal with economically wishes to continue in business, effects on future business (directly, as when current customers refuse to deal with such suppliers in the future, and indirectly, through reputation effects on other current and prospective trading partners) act as a performance bond against misbehavior, leading to far better outcomes than the scare stories imply. As students of game theory recognize, repeated games generate very different strategies than one-shot games.
Consider an example. I can cheat you today by providing lower than claimed quality, and doing so would generate $1 million in increased profits for me. If it would leave my future business relationships unchanged, I have an incentive to do so. However, what if I expect the resulting damage to my reputation will lose me more than $1 in future discounted profits? I can cheat you, but I won’t because I have no incentive to. The problem in this case is solved by markets’ reputation mechanisms. Even if the future losses don’t completely eliminate my incentives to cheat, they sharply reduce them, letting much of the air out of the “we need government regulation to protect you” balloon.
This mechanism, while ignored by “nothing can be done if the state doesn’t do it” acolytes, is far from new. For instance, the famous Maghribi traders of Northern Africa relied on reputations to deal with problems in international trade in the 11th century…
In contrast, when governments displace voluntary arrangements with coercive impositions, lies displace truth in two ways. Not only is the competition to get political power based largely on misrepresentations, but government’s coercive impositions also replace the truth revealed in voluntary market behavior with lies. What is the effect on society? It isn’t pretty. And even though it is an essential aspect of government intrusion into citizens’ affairs, not a single moral or ethical system endorses lying. Lies will not set you free. Not only does the truth set us free, but freedom in our cooperative endeavors reveals truths we have no other way of knowing.
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Larry Summers Comes Clean Ahead Of J-Hole, Admits Central Planners Are Impotent | Zero Hedge
Posted by M. C. on August 22, 2019
by Tyler Durden
Larry Summers is not one to be shy about sharing his opinion on any and every media channel about just how bad President Trump’s policies are, and how much better everything was in the world under President Obama.
However, in an epic thread of apparent honesty, the former director of the National Economic Council for President Obama took to Twitter to dispel any myths about the omnipotence of central planners and to confirm there’s nothing anyone can do to save the world from doom (especially Jay Powell’s speech tomorrow).
Mea Culpa? Or partisan political pandering to reinforce the “recession is imminent and there’s nothing to stop it and it’s Trump’s fault and that means Trump’s unelectable” narrative?
You decide…
Summers begins his diatribe by addressing the big imminent issue ahead of us:
“Coming into Jackson Hole, economists are grappling with a major issue: Can central banking as we know it be the primary tool of macroeconomic stabilization in the industrial world over the next decade?“
Coming into Jackson Hole, economists are grappling with a major issue: Can central banking as we know it be the primary tool of macroeconomic stabilization in the industrial world over the next decade? In my forthcoming paper w/ @annastansbury, we argue that this is in doubt. 1/
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
His worry – they are running out of ammo and what ammo they have is losing its mojo…
There is little room for interest rate cuts. In every US recession since the 1970s, the fed funds rate was cut >500bps. In most, the real rate fell >400bps below the neutral rate. Now, the max. feasible cut is 200-300bps, bringing the real rate only 150-250bps below neutral. 2/ pic.twitter.com/6QfiaVykU7
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
This limited space for interest rate cuts is true of the US, which has the highest interest rates in the industrialized world. It is even more true of Europe and Japan. 3/
QE and forward guidance have been tried on a substantial scale. We are living in a post QE and forward guidance world. It is hard to believe that changing adverbs here and there or altering the timing of press conferences or the mode of presenting projections is consequential. 4/
Then, Summers goes after central planner over-confidence…
We usually agree w/ Janet Yellen, but believed at the time of her 2016 Jackson Hole speech -and believe even more in today’s world of 150bp 10yr rates- that her optimism about the existing monetary policy toolkit is misplaced. 5/https://t.co/Kg95Pnh65Qhttps://t.co/iqQqrDpIcY
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
Black hole monetary economics – interest rates stuck at zero with no real prospect of escape – is now the confident market expectation in Europe & Japan, with essentially zero or negative yields over a generation. The United States is only one recession away from joining them. 6/
Everywhere in the industrial world, the risks of a sharp upturn in unemployment appear greater than the risks of a sharp upturn in inflation (even though market expectations of inflation are clearly below 2 percent targets). 7/
The one thing that was taught as axiomatic to economics students around the world was that monetary authorities could over the long term create as much inflation as they wanted through monetary policy. This proposition is now very much in doubt. 8/
Wait, what!!!??
Many believe that events proved Alvin Hansen wrong about secular stagnation. On the contrary, the fact that it took WW2 to lift the world out of depression proves his point. Absent the military buildup, a liquidity trap deflation scenario would likely have persisted. 9/
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
Call it the black hole problem, secular stagnation, or Japanification, this set of issues should be what central banks are worrying about. 10/
We have come to agree w/ the point long stressed by Post Keynesian economists & recently emphasized by Palley that the role of specific frictions in economic fluctuations should be de-emphasized relative to a more fundamental lack of aggregate demand. 11/https://t.co/cyhGDDvAsM
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
In our forthcoming paper, we argue that it minimizes our predicament to see it – as is current consensus – simply in terms of a falling neutral rate, low inflation, and the effective lower bound on nominal rates. Secular stagnation is a more profound issue. 12/
Limited nominal GDP growth in the face of very low interest rates has been interpreted as evidence simply that the neutral rate has fallen substantially. There may well be more to it than that. 13/
We believe it is at least equally plausible that the impact of interest rates on aggregate demand has declined sharply, and that the marginal impact falls off as rates fall. 14/
And then Summers drops the real hammer – rate cuts are useless… or worse, are actually worsening the situation.
It is even plausible that in some cases interest rate cuts may reduce aggregate demand: because of target saving behavior, reversal rate effects on fin. intermediaries, option effects on irreversible investment, and the arithmetic effect of lower rates on gov’t deficits. 15/
This can be illustrated using a textbook macroeconomic diagram with a very steep, non-linear or even backward-bending IS curve. 16/ pic.twitter.com/MKLzEjTPHs
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
If the central problem for macroeconomic stabilization is a falling neutral real interest rate – what might be called “old new Keynesian” economics – monetary policy can achieve full employment if it can get the interest rate low enough. 17/
In contrast under the secular stagnation view we have outlined – what might be called “new old Keynesian” economics – interest rate cuts, even if feasible, may be at best only weakly effective at stimulating aggregate demand and at worst counterproductive. 18/
There is the further point that reducing interest rates may degrade future economic performance for any of the following reasons. 19/
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
First, financial instability. The financial crisis had roots in bubbles & excessive leverage caused by efforts to maintain demand after the 2001 recession. Japan’s late 1980s bubble had roots in a low interest rate tight fiscal environment after the 1987 stock market crash. 20/
Second, risks of zombification of firms. Firms that do not face debt service payments are like students who do not have to take tests. They can drift along complacently & ultimately unsuccessfully. And low rates may contribute to increased monopoly power and reduced dynamism. 21/
Third, risks of bank failures. Low rates crowd bank profits and franchise value, making them more vulnerable to adverse shocks at any given level of regulatory capital. 22/
Fourth, risks of further reducing monetary policy effectiveness. To the extent to which rate cuts now “borrow” demand from the future as firms and consumers bring forward investment and durable purchases, low rates now may imply less effective monetary policy in the future. 23/
Summers then goes further – blasting Central planners for claiming they can “contain” the issues…
The right issue for macroeconomists to be focused on is assuring adequate aggregate demand. We believe it is dangerous for central bankers to suggest that they have this challenge under control – or that with their current toolkit they will be able to get it under control. 24/
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
Obviously fiscal policy needs to be a major focus, especially given what low or negative interest rates mean for the sustainability of deficits. 25/
But the level of demand is also influenced by structural policies: e.g. pay-as-you-go social security, higher retirement ages, improved social insurance, support for private infrastructure investment, redistribution from the high-saving rich to the liquidity-constrained poor. 26/
The high inflation and high interest rates of the 1970s generated a revolution in macroeconomic thinking, policy and institutions. The low inflation, low interest rates and stagnation of the last decade has been longer and more serious and deserves at least an equal response. 27/
But at least he ends on an upbeat note ahead of Jay Powell’s speech tomorrow…NOT!
We hope this will come out of Jackson Hole’s focus on “Challenges for Monetary Policy” – but we are not holding our breath. 28/
— Lawrence H. Summers (@LHSummers) August 22, 2019
So, after that 28 tweet thread of self-flagellation, wouldn’t it have been more interesting if Summers had said all that oh, ten years ago?
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Posted in Uncategorized | Tagged: central banking, Central Planners, interest rate, Larry Summers, macroeconomic stabilization, QE | Leave a Comment »