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Posts Tagged ‘M1’

How to Avoid Depressions? Foster Saving and Investment | Mises Wire

Posted by M. C. on December 31, 2021

Contrary to the popular thinking, economic depressions are not caused by a strong decline in the money stock, but are rather the result of the depleted pool of savings. This depletion emerges because of the previous loose monetary policies. A tighter monetary stance arrests the depletion of the pool of savings, thereby laying the foundation for an economic recovery.

https://mises.org/wire/how-avoid-depressions-foster-saving-and-investment

Frank Shostak

In his writings, the leader of the monetarist school of thinking, Milton Friedman, blamed central bank policies for causing the Great Depression of 1930s. According to Friedman, the Federal Reserve failed to pump enough reserves into the banking system to prevent a collapse of the money stock. Because of this, Friedman held, the M1 money stock, which stood at $26.34 billion on March 1930, fell to $19 billion by April 1933—a decline of 27.9 percent.1

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According to Friedman, as a result of the collapse in the money stock, economic growth also dropped off. By July 1932, industrial production had fallen by over 31 percent year on year (see chart). Also, year on year the Consumer Price Index (CPI) had plunged. By October 1932, the CPI had declined by 10.7 percent (see chart).

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A closer examination of the historical data shows that the Fed was actually pursuing very easy monetary policy in its attempt to revive the economy.2

The Fed’s holdings of US government securities depict the extent of monetary injections. In October 1929, holdings of US government securities stood at $165 million. By December 1932, these holdings had surged to $2.432 billion—an increase of 1,374 percent (see chart).

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Also, the three-month Treasury bill rate fell from almost 1.50 percent on April 1931 to 0.4 percent by July 1931 (see chart).

Another indication of the Fed’s loose monetary stance was the widening differential between the yield rates on the ten-year Treasury bond and the three-month Treasury bill. The differential increased from 0.04 percent in January 1930 to 2.80 percent by September 1931 (see chart; an upward-sloping yield curve indicates a loose monetary stance).

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The sharp fall in the money stock during 1930–33 does not indicate that the Federal Reserve did not try to pump money. Instead, the decline in the money stock came because of the shrinking pool of savings brought about by the previous loose monetary policies of the Fed.

The yield curve between 1920 and 1924 reveals this easy stance by the Fed: the yield spread increased from –0.67 percent in October 1920 to 2 percent by August 1924.

The reversal of this stance by the Fed, which saw the yield spread decline from 2 percent in August 1924 to –1.45 percent by May 1929, finally burst the monetary bubble (see chart).

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In addition to this, at some periods the monetary injections were nothing short of massive, contradicting Friedman’s claim. For instance, the yearly growth rate of M1 increased from –12.6 percent in September 1921 to 11 percent by January 1923, and then from –0.4 percent in February 1924 the yearly growth rate accelerated to 9.8 percent by February 1925. Such large monetary pumping amounted to a massive exchange of nothing for something.

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Why Has There Been So Little Consumer Price Inflation? | Mises Wire

Posted by M. C. on May 13, 2020

But it is not true that price inflation is generally low. It simply happens outside of the official numbers, and most people feel it.

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Every once in a while economists want to go out on a limb with their models and publicly make forecasts on what the future rate of price inflation will be. The current COVID-19 lockdown is no exception. Many economists have warned us of potentially very high rates of price inflation, because monetary stimulus on a massive scale meets a negative supply shock. Others are afraid that the monetary and fiscal stimuli won’t be strong enough to compensate for the drop in private spending, resulting in a deflationary spiral. More often than not, both parties are wrong.

It seems important to ask what it is that they try to forecast and how closely connected it is to monetary policy interventions. When we look at the consumer price inflation rates in the eurozone, there really has not been much going on over the past decades, despite a rather activist monetary policy. Since 1999, the average annual inflation rate, measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), has been about 1.65 percent. The rate for any one year never went above 3.2 percent—the value reached in 2008—and was negative only once, in 2015, at –0.6 percent. So, all in all that’s a fairly narrow band, and the average aligns rather nicely with the Eropean Central Bank’s (ECB) stated target, although some economists would like to see it even closer to 2 percent.

Figure 1: Year-on-Year Percentage Change from January of the Previous Year to January of the Respective Year

M2 and Real GDP Gap
Sources: ECB, IMF. The explanatory gap is defined as the growth rate of M1 minus the growth rates of the HICP and real GDP.

In contrast, the eurozone’s M1 monetary aggregate has grown at an average annual rate of 7.59 percent over the same period (1999–2020), which means that it has much more than quadrupled, whereas consumer prices have only grown by a bit more than 40 percent. One would not expect all of the monetary expansion to translate into proportional price inflation, but the observed gap is surprisingly large and persistent. Real economic growth according to official numbers hardly fills it. Real GDP has grown by merely 32 percent since 1999, or by an average annual rate of 1.35 percent. A back-of-the-envelope calculation by which we subtract both the average real growth rate and the average rate of consumer price inflation from the average growth rate of the money stock M1 leaves us with an explanatory gap of about 4.6 percent per year. Where does the money go if it is not absorbed by higher unit prices for consumer goods or a larger real output?

Well, there are essentially two possible explanations. First, there may have been increases in the reservation demand for money. Put differently, there may have been a substantial decrease in the velocity of money. Indeed, if one believes that the quantity equation—PY = MV, where P is the HICP, Y is real GDP, and M is the money stock M1—accurately relates the empirical magnitudes considered, then yes, velocity (V) must have taken up the slack. But since velocity here is merely residual, it explains the entire gap simply by definition, which is to say that it does not explain anything at all. There surely are changes in the reservation demand for money, but should they be so persistently positive every year? And why should they be so high (see Figure 1)?

The second possibility is that inflationary pressures actually materialize outside of consumer goods industries, most notably in the markets for long-term assets, such as stocks and real estate. This would imply that the HICP inflation measure grossly underestimates the general rate of price inflation. The surge of asset price inflation over the past decades has been widely documented, and this clearly matters to the average household. When asset prices rise it becomes harder to attain any given level of real wealth if you are not there already.

Figure 2: HICP Inflation Rates and the Median Inflation Perceptions in the Euro Area since 2004

Inflation Perceptions HICP
Source: Business and consumer survey database, European Commission.

The answer lies most likely in some combination of these two causes and some other factors. But the second cause—inflationary pressures outside of consumer goods industries—seems to be the more important one. It is especially important if we want to evaluate how well average citizens are actually doing. And it turns out that if we listen to what they have to say, we find a rather interesting empirical result.

Since 2004, the European Commission has published survey data on inflation perceptions. Figure 2 shows how those perceptions compare to the HICP inflation measure from 2004–19, the period for which data on inflation perceptions is available. The geometric average of the median perceived inflation rate over this time was 6.57 percent. Over the same period, the measured HICP inflation rate was 1.57 percent. So, on average, median perceived inflation has been 5 percentage points higher than the official rate of consumer price inflation. The average explanatory gap as defined above has been 4.8 percentage points, which is remarkably close to what the median respondent in the survey perceives to be the difference between actual and measured inflation (5 percentage points). The difference between perceptions and official numbers fills the gap quite nicely.

Now, it is very likely that perceptions are upward biased,1 but it is hard to believe that they completely miss the mark. The overall inflationary pressure does not seem to be covered by the official HICP numbers. In fact, the latter tend to be rigid relative to asset prices. This, among other things, has given monetary policymakers comfortable wiggle room for engaging in ever more expansionary measures without failing to remain below the 2 percent target. But it is not true that price inflation is generally low. It simply happens outside of the official numbers, and most people feel it.

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