Just like CDC contaminated COVID test kits.

Don’t be intimidated by the philosophically impoverished. Their bluster is their only tool against you.

https://www.lewrockwell.com/2020/06/allan-stevo/just-to-be-clear-the-covid-19-vaccine-will-be-rigorously-tested/

By Allan Stevo

Some people claim that the Covid-19 vaccine will not be rigorously tested. That’s a lie.

I worked for a software company once that didn’t test its code in a testing environment. They tested their code “in production.” That worked until it didn’t. Everything fell apart. Customers lost millions. It was the most awful product release I’ve ever witnessed.

Similarly, the Covid-19 vaccine will be tested in production. Notable examples come to mind when people talk about testing vaccines in production.

1955 — Cutter Labs Polio Vaccine Catastrophe 

As reported in the Journal of The Royal Society of Medicine “In April 1955 more than 200,000 children in five Western and mid-Western USA states received a polio vaccine in which the process of inactivating the live virus proved to be defective. Within days there were reports of paralysis and within a month the first mass vaccination programme against polio had to be abandoned. Subsequent investigations revealed that the vaccine, manufactured by the California-based family firm of Cutter Laboratories, had caused 40,000 cases of polio, leaving 200 children with varying degrees of paralysis and killing 10.”

1955-1970 — Japanese SMON “Epidemic”

Smithsonian Magazine recalls  the 1955-1970 epidemic of subacute myelo-optic neuropathy (SMON), which mystified and terrorized many, though ultimately proving to be medically induced. While not due to a vaccine, the concern is similar. Examples of “cure as cause,” are legion. Johns Hopkins, in a 2016 published study, pointed to medical intervention as the third leading cause of death over an eight year period. At 250,000 deaths per year, medical error surpasses the CDC reported third leading cause of death — respiratory diseases, which claim 150,000 Americans a year. The Johns Hopkins team claimed the CDC does not effectively collect data on medical error.

1976 — Untested Swine Flu Vaccine  

The 1976 and 2009 stories of untested vaccines offer detailed lessons for our era in their foolhardy similarity.

“This is a story about one time over 40 years ago when poor decision-making on the part of the government led to the unnecessary vaccination of about 45 million citizens,” reports Smithsonian Magazine.

There was a novel form of the flu that killed a US solder in February 1976. The flu that was expected that fall was widely reported to be an outbreak unlike anything seen since the 1918 Spanish Flu.

Smithsonian Magazine goes further “To avoid an epidemic, the CDC believed, at least 80 percent of the United States population would need to be vaccinated. When they asked Congress for the money to do it, politicians jumped on the potential good press of saving their constituents from the plague.”

“The World Health Organization adopted more of a wait-and-see attitude to the virus… They eventually found that the strain of flu that year was not a repeat or escalation of the 1918 flu, but ‘the U.S. government was unstoppable.’”

President Ford was up for re-election that fall and something had to be done. A Salon report from 2009, cautioning President Obama against mass vaccination continues with the story:

“1976 was the year of the U.S. Bicentennial. 1976 was a presidential election year. 1976 was two years after Watergate caused Nixon’s resignation, and one year after the fall of Saigon. The U.S. government, both Republicans and Democrats, had never been held in such low esteem. Practically every elected official felt an overwhelming itch that patriotic year to do something to get the public thinking of them as good guys again. A swine flu pandemic was an opportunity on a plate. What better way to get into the good graces of the voters than to save them from a plague?

“Knowing the Republican president would not, could not veto a bill he requested, the Democratically controlled House attached $1.8 billion dollars in welfare and environmental spending to the flu bill.

“The 1976 to 1977 flu season was the most flu-free since records had been kept; a condition that was apparently unrelated to the vaccination program. The Great Swine Flu Epidemic of 1976 never took place.”

Once informative on the topic of caution around inherently risky medical intervention such as needless vaccines, Salon, The New York Times, and NPR have all fallen silent, as mass vaccination campaigns have mystifyingly become yet another liberal shibboleth.

2009 — Untested Swine Flu Vaccine 

As reported by Buzzfeed, and not too many other outlets, “Dozens of NHS workers are fighting for compensation after developing narcolepsy from a swine flu vaccine that was rushed into service without the usual testing when the disease spread across the globe in 2009. They say it has destroyed their careers and their health.”

It’s a story of government employees naively trusting that everything would be okay if they received a vaccine that had been rushed through testing.

Tested in Production — Taking A Lesson From Other Industries 

Since the Covid-19 vaccine will be tested in production, with very little preliminary testing, it’s worth taking lessons from other industries that have entities that regularly test in production in order to determine how best to effect this end goal.

Best Practices for Testing In Production — E-mail Communication 

When testing in production, a good feedback loop is needed. A direct email address to the manufacturer, ideally read daily by all members of the team that developed the product is helpful.

These emails can’t be filtered by customer service, marketing, or the product team. That risks only a few emails being sent along. The data from these emails can’t be compiled into a document and passed along. They can’t be filtered through a doctor that determines if the data is useful. They can’t be filtered through some obscure government compensation program.

All raw data needs to get to all the right people as quickly as possible, if critical infrastructure is going to be tested in production.

In such a situation, where a vaccine is tested in production, the recipient needs to be handed a piece of paper that says the equivalent of “If ANYTHING seems different, e-mail this address immediately.” Oversampling must be preferenced over undersampling.

If there is going to be success in an effort to test in production, then as much as possible, the research and product teams who developed the vaccine and their executive leadership team need to receive the email of the mother crying at 2 a.m. over her suddenly unhealthy baby, or the son trying to figure out why his mother suddenly took a turn for the worse 11 hours after getting a vaccine.

Best Practices For Testing In Production — Telephone Communication  

Better than an email, because sometimes written words can’t convey what a voice can, is a cell phone number answered by someone on that team 24-7.

We can’t have the kind of feedback loop we have now around vaccines and expect a test in production to work. There has to be a little more skin in the game before a vaccine is tested in production.

Best Practices For Testing In Production — Full Disclosure, Clearly Presented   

There has to be full disclosure and informed consent along the lines of “We don’t know how well, if at all, this vaccine works, and we don’t know how safe, if at all, this vaccine is. You may be dead tomorrow because of this vaccine. This vaccine may disable you for life. We really don’t know.”

It must be plain language. Not legalese. It would be best if it were written by a pipe fitter or a stevedore during his lunch break. It should seek to be about as honest and direct as the European tobacco carton warnings showing photos of tumor-filled lungs and gum cancer lesions.

The Key To Achieving The Manhattan Project Of Vaccines 

It can be taken a step further if those involved in the vaccine manufacture process want to get feedback from the vaccine as quickly as possible and to have as safe and effective of a vaccine as possible, a “Manhattan Project” of vaccines, as some have suggested.

It’s not in the development that the Manhattan Project of vaccines becomes helpful, it’s in the rollout, in the introduction, in the feedback loop, in the follow through. Responsibility, however, is anathema in our era. Drug manufactures have sizable teams dedicated to the mitigation of risk, and the socialization of harm. These are modern-sounding, alternate terms for the age-old concept of “avoiding responsibility.” The responsibility avoidance teams at vaccine manufacturers often rival the size of those teams that help develop the product and those who help in the follow through with the product.

Development work may include patient sampling, virus isolation, virus characterization, standardizing, manufacturing, releasing, manufacture scale up, validation, safety, efficacy, monitoring of adverse events, and regulatory review and approval. Responsibility avoidance might include legal, marketing, lobbying, post-vaccination trials, medical liability insurance, product liability, post-marketing, and scheduling.

Since avoiding responsibility is so written into the DNA of large corporations, and large institutions, fresh ideas like those mentioned in this paper are needed if a Manhattan Project of vaccines is to make any headway.

To expand that thinking, at the time of vaccination with the untested vaccines, if a patient has a problem, in addition to an email address, the following can be provided to a patient in order to facilitate the feedback loop: the personal cell phone, spouse’s personal cell phone, home address, and vacation home address of all executives, government officials, spokespersons, and media sources who endorse the vaccine should be provided to a patient both on a handout and in electronic form.

The Manhattan Project Of Vaccine Safety  Read the rest of this entry »